花了点时间，把《灭火：美国金融危机及其教训》（英文版：Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and its Lessons）一书读完，网上有总结得比较好的思维导图，如上图所示。除了这些内容之外，我读完后多少也有些想法，总结如下：
- 经济危机（或者叫金融危机）一定还会出现，上世纪30年代的算第一次大规模经济危机的话，2008年算第二次，书中作者把它称之为Great Depression 2.0，也许第三次和前两次不完全一样。历史不会简单重复，但经常押韵。
- 所有的金融危机都是遵循“狂热、恐慌、溃败（mania panic crash）”这样的三部曲模式，但人们包括金融业从业者和政客们，常常会错误地认为当前的状态会持久不变，无论是在狂热还是溃败的状态中，所以看不到狂热之后风险即将来临，也看不到崩溃后，春天总会到来。
These vulnerabilities were allowed to fester by America’s balkanized financial regulatory bureaucracy, a hodgepodge of agencies and authorities and regulations that for decades had failed to keep pace with changing market realities and rapid financial innovations.
These problems did not seem pressing during the boom, when the financial system appeared unusually stable, conventional wisdom held that home prices would continue to rise indefinitely, and many in Wall Street, Washington, and academia believed that serious financial crises were a thing of the past.
We are all believers in the power of free markets, and we were all reluctant to rescue reckless bankers and investors from their own mistakes.
which is why we think it makes sense to think about crises the way Buddhists think about death: with uncertainty about the timing and circumstances, but certainty that it will happen eventually.
History doesn’t repeat itself, but as Mark Twain supposedly said, it often rhymes.
Panic is contagious.
While all crises begin with credit booms, not all credit booms end in crises, and the financial system seemed more stable than ever in the early years of the twenty-first century;
But financial crises will never be a thing of the past.
Long periods of stability can create overconfidence that breeds instability, as the economist Hyman Minsky famously observed.
It is during those boom times, when liquidity seems limitless and asset values seem destined to keep rising, that risk taking tends to get excessive, posing dangers that can extend well beyond the risk takers.
But none of us ever believed financial crises were obsolete, perhaps because we had spent so much of our careers thinking about them—Ben
Goldman had learned that good times never keep rolling forever, that panics can drag down the responsible along with the reckless, and that in a crisis, liquidity is king.
“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”
IT’S HARD TO FIX SOMETHING BEFORE IT BREAKS.
the only way to stop a run is to show the world there’s no need to run, to make credit easily available to solvent firms until the panic subsides: “Lend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on lending.”
Every banker knows that if he has to prove that he is worthy of credit, however good may be his arguments, in fact his credit is gone.”
THE FIRE BURNED FOR MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE IT consumed Lehman Brothers, but many Americans still believe the financial crisis began with Lehman’s collapse.
capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell.
if your neighbor sets his house on fire by smoking in bed, you want the fire department to put it out before it spreads to your house and your entire town, even though letting it burn would punish the perpetrator and send a strong message that smoking in bed will never be tolerated.
But we suspect that neither high-tech monitoring nor prudential supervision will fully protect the financial system from the failures of imagination and limitations of memory that seem hardwired in human beings.
The story of how the crisis happened is a complex story about risky leverage, runnable funding, shadow banking, rampant securitization, and outdated regulation.
As the Chinese philosopher and military strategist Sun Tzu supposedly warned: If you want peace, prepare for war.
But markets have short memories, and as history has demonstrated, long periods of confidence and stability can produce overconfidence and instability.
Unfortunately, our divided and paralyzed political system seems incapable of thinking ahead and making tough choices about the future.